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Young,27 the proviso is construed to declare that a judicial sale cannot be
had "until the debtor might evidence an intention to pay into court the ap-
praised value of the land." A distribution of loss through the reduction of
indebtedness to a point commensurate with the earning capacity of the land
is rendered nugatory by this provision for judicial sale. At most it offers
a scant moment in which other forces may effect a restoration of earning
power that will rehabilitate both debtor and creditor. Whether the principle
of moratorium is within the conception of bankruptcy necessarily remains
conjectural. The evolutionary progress of bankruptcy toward the principle
of rehabilitation tempts a belief in the constitutionality of this aspect of the
amendment. It is submitted that the balance of social values support this
legislation. The preservation of the industry of man in union with the imple-
ments of industry alone can fulfill and preserve the credit structure.
J.F T.
JURY-INTENTIONAL EXCLUSION OF WOMEN.-Appellant was convicted of em-
bezzlement. At the trial, the male defendant challenged the array upon the
ground that the jury commissioners had purposely and intentionally excluded
the names of women from those selected for jury service Testimony of the
commissioners supported this charge. Held, error to overrule such chal-
lenge.1
Is a jury selected from a jury box from which the names of women have
been intentionally excluded by the jury commissioners a legally drawn jury,
and if not, what are the consequences of such actions? Substantially, this was
the question which was recently presented to the Indiana Supreme Court.
The situation which provoked it is typical. The Lagrange county court
house did not facilitate a convenient separation of male and female jurors,
should a mixed jury ever be drawn. As a result, the Lagrange Circuit judge
and his jury commissioners had reached a tacit understanding that the names
of women be omitted from the jury box from which the panel was drawn to
avoid complications.
Although there is some conflict,2 it is now generally settled that women
are competent ind qualified jurors.3 Consequently, when the defendant in
this proceeding in the Lagrange circuit was to be tried by a jury from which
women were excluded, be challenged the array on the above ground. The
challenge was overuled, but on appeal the court refused any variance from
what it considered the hard and fast lines of statutory instructions to jury
27 (1935), 12 Fed. Supp. 30. Although the statute makes provision for a
reasonable rental charge, there is to be no payment until the end of the first
year of the moratorium. The court declares this to be an unsecured promise
"that deprives the mortgagee of an otherwise positive right to income for that
period."
In the case, In re Slaughter (1935), 12 Fed. Supp. 206, the court apparently
interprets the statute to authorize a judicial sale at the insistence of the
creditor before the end of the "three years probationary period."
I Walter v. State (1935), 195 N. E. 268 (Ind.).
2 18 Georgetown L. J. 393, 394, 16 A. L. R. 1154.
3 Palmer v. State (1926), 197 Ind. 625, 150 N. E. 917, Moore v. State
(1926), 197 Ind. 640, 151 N. E. 689; Wilkinson v. State (1926), 197 Ind. 642,
151 N. E. 690; Jalbert v. State (1928), 200 Ind. 380, 165 N. E. 522; Common-
wealth v. Maxwell (1921), 271 Pa. 378, 114 At. 825, People v. Baltz (1920),
212 Mich. 530, 180 N. W 423, 4 A. L. R. 140.
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commissioners as to the mode of impanelling. The court announced further
that there was no obligation upon the defendant to show that "his substantial
rights were impaired, or that the jurors were biased or prejudiced against
him, or that he did not have a fair trial" so long as the jury was not selected
according to the letter of the statute.4 The theory is that the defendant has
-a right to a trial by a jury which has been legally selected and an arbitrary
exclusion of a class by the commissioners makes an illegally drawn jury.
In determining when a jury is legally drawn, the particular court exercises
considerable discretion. The line of demarcation is so vague 5 that one cannot
critically approach a separate decision. Yet the tests used in the cases and
texts seem to be simple and easy of application. In the first place, it is
generally presumed of jury commissioners, as of other public officers, that
they have acted regularly and in accordance with their officially designated
powers and duties.6 Even if this presumption is successfully rebutted, errors
and irregularities in failing to comply strictly with the statutory provision
for making up a jury list do not always serve as a ground for challenging
the array or serve to invalidate the list. The next principle for application
is that such provisions are usually held to be directory only and not man-
datory.7 Does an examination of the particular section of the statute that
might govern offer a clue as to whether it is a mandatory or directory
provision? Section 4-3304, Burns' Ann. St. 1933, provides for the selection
of jurors "from the names of legal voters and citizens of the United States
on the tax duplicates of the county for the current year."8 If the jury com-
missioners had arbitrarily included any persons other than legal voters and
citizens on the tax duplicates, it would not even be suggested that it whs
properly drawn and that such provision was directory only and not manda-
tory.9 To that extent this part of the statute may very reasonably be deemed
a mandatory one. Positing this, then, the court does not seem to be taking a
step much farther when it says that this provision must be interpreted as
meaning that "the names shall be selected from the names of 'all' the quali-
.fled voters on the tax duplicates:' It follows then, that when the com-
missioners arbitrarily excluded a class who would be qualified under the
terms of the statute, they had not complied with a mandatory provision and
the array was imperfect and invalid.10
The question before the court, as simply stated above, is almost as simply
answered, but there is some objection to reaching a result through reasoning
that provokes the layman's observation that justice is submerged in tech-
nicalities. Here, a trial that was fair and orderly was set aside because of
the omission of the names of women from the jury box. Was there not still
a trial by a jury of the defendant's peers, competent, qualified, and impartial?
4Walter v. State (1935), 195 N. E. 268, 270 (Ind.).
592 A. L. R. 1110.
6 Jones, Law of Evidence (1924), 3rd ed., sec. 30; McKelvey, Law of
Evidence, (1924, 3rd ed.) p. 134; Karnes v. Commonwealth (1919), 125 Va.
758, 919 S. E. 562; 4 A. L. R. 1509.
7Brown v. State (1918), 14 Okla. Cr. 609, 174 Pac. 1102; Commonwealth
v. Zillafrow (1903), 207 Pa. 274, 56 Atl. 539; 92 A. L. R. 1110.
8 Acts 1881, (Indiana) Spec. Sess., ch. 69, sec. 2, 557.
9 State v. Jenkins (1884), 32 Kan. 477, 4 Pac. 809 (challenge to array),
People v. Thacker (1896), 108 Mich. 652, 66.N. W 562 (challenge for cause).
1OMitchell v. Likens (1833), 3 Blackf. 258, Mitchell v. Denbo (1833), 3
Blackf. 259.
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Has the defendant been prejudiced? Has he been deprived of any of his
constitutional guarantees, equal protection of the laws, due process? To these
questions one seeks an affirmative answer before a jury panel may be reason-
ably vitiated. To uphold a challenge to an array without showing some such
harm is to merit the badge of technicality.
Thus we find other jurisdictions seeking to find an encroachment upon
some right when similar situations arise. The cases generally hold that an
irregularity in the mechanical process of drawing names for a jury panel
will not substantiate any complaint by the defendant, unless he can show
it to be prejudicial to him.-' They indicate that the same requirement
applies when there is an exclusion of an eligible class from the jury list,
since the general rule is that only a person affected by discrimination in
making up jury lists may complain.12 Thus a party may object to a trial
before a jury from which the class to which he belongs has been excluded.1 3
But the exclusion of women from a jury impanelled to try a man for a crime,
even if wrongful, does not deprive him of any rights or privileges and he
cannot be heard to complain. 1 4 Some injury is required. 1 5 Neither could
a feminine defendant protest because the summoning officer selected only
women for jurors and excluded all men. 10  Such holdings would seem to be
contra to the principal case in that they sought to find a present injury.1 7
The Indiana court, however, finds a general presumption of prejudice
against the defendant whenever the jury commissioners agree to, or upon
suggestion do, exclude any class within the qualifications set out by the
legislature. The presumption is aided 'by setting out specifically the preju-
dicial forms of discrimination that might be exercised by the commission-
ers.
1 8 It is possible that actually harmful discriminations could be called to
the attention of the court when, and if, they are committed, without the aid
11 92 A. L. R. 1110.
32 52 A. L. R. 920; Green v. State (1882), 73 Ala. 26.
13 One of the latest and most famous cases involving such exclusion of the
class to -which the defendant belonged was Norris v. Alabama (1935), 55
S. Ct. 579. There the Supreme Court found prima facie evidence that the
defendant had been denied the equal protection of the laws. 3 Geo. Wash.
L. R. 388, 35 Col. L. R. 776. Yet the defendant has no right to have any
portion of the jury which tries him to be of his own race. Virginia v. Rives
(1880), 100 U. S. 313. Nor is he, himself being denied the privilege of being
a juror in this instance. However the decisions deal strongly with the pos-
sibility of prejudicial partiality against the defendant, and the rule is generally
followed that it is a reversible irregularity to exclude arbitrarily the members
of the same race, color or religion of the defendant. Montgomery v. State
(1908), 55 Fla. 97, 45 So. 879; Smith v. State (1910), 4 Okla. Cr. 328, 111
Pac. 960; Farrow v. State (1908), 91 Miss. 509, 45 So. 619; Jaurez v. State
(1925), 102 Tex. Cr. 297, 277 S. W 1091.
14 McKinney v. State (1892), 3 Wyo. 719, 30 Pac. 293, 16 L. R. A. 710; 52
A. L. R. 922.3 5 State v. James (1921), 96 N. J. L. 132, 114 At. 553, 16 A. L. R. 1141,
State v. Carlino (1922), 98 N. J. L. 48, 118 At. 784.
16People v. Manuel (1919), 41 Cal. App. 153, 182 Pac. 306.
17 Further vidence of the conflict between the principal Indiana case and
those in other jurisdictions is the fact that the situation which provoked the
challenge in two of those cases is the same as that in Walter v. State, namely,
inadequate facilities. People v. Manuel (1919), 41 Cal. App. 153, 182 Pac.
306, State v. James (1921), 96 N. J. L. 132; 11 At. 553.
18 Walter v. State (1935), 195 N. E. 268, 270 (Ind.).
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of this presumption. But the court, in some degree, does meet the objection
of "mere technicality" with this practically conclusive presumption of prejudice.
How then, can we formulate a practical answer to our original question
on the basis of the indistinct pattern of the cases? The difficulty lies in the
fact that we must work with two general principlesthat are applied, which
do not contradict each other and yet are entirely divorced. On the one
hand are the cases holding that the statute must be substantially complied
with and a disregard of material provisions will support a challenge to the
array, 1. e., material provisions are mandatory ones and violations thereof
invalidate the panel.19 But these decisions do not require injury in virtue
of the irregularity complained of. On the other hand are the cases which
do not permit an array to be questioned because of an irregularity in the
impanelling, unless some prejudicial injury is shown.20 Separating the two
principles is the fact that this latter group of cases generally do not concern
themselves with whether it was a mandatory or directory provision of the
statute which had been violated. Clearly, the latest Indiana decision falls
within the first group. In this respect it is consistent with earlier Indiana
cases where challenges were invoked against an irregularity in the im-
panelling. 2 1
Our court's method of deciding the validity of such complaints may not
be entirely discredited. The statutes on the manner of selecting a jury are
designed by the legislature to the end of providing a fair, impartial, and
orderly trial, and only by the threat of reversal can compliance with such
statutes be secured. It may readily be seen how impractical it may be for
the complainant to show wherein he has been directly injured by a divergence
from the procedure set out. The fact remains, however, that the cases dealing
with the specific problem of the exclusion of a certain class from the jury
lists do not accord with Walter v. State.2 2 Those that do invalidate the
panel upon such exclusion, do so where it is obvious that harm is not im-
probable. 2 3  The Indiana courts disregard this specific problem, but as
suggested, not without cause. By deciding only whether there has been a
material departure from the statute, they presumably decide whether there
has been actual harm, since the legislature has already decided how the jury
should be selected to obtain the fairest and most impartial panel. 2 4
Because of the two divergent propositions already pointed out, it is sub-
mitted that the problem involving the trial of a man by a jury from which
women have been excluded, might have been decided in either way and still
not be subject to technical criticism. (1) A challenge to such array might
19jones v. State (1832),-3 Blackf. 37, Mitchell v. Likens (1833), 3 Blackf.
258, People v. Boston (1923), 309 IlI. 77, 139 N. E. 880; Donnegan v. State
(1920), 89 Tex. Cr. 193, 230 S. W 166, State v. WValker (1921), 192 Ia. 823,
185 N. W 619; Wright v. Stuart (1839), 5 Blackf. 120; Green v. State (1882),
59 Md. 123, 43 Am. Rep. 542; 16 R. C. L. 234.
20 State v. Barnes (1909), 54 Wash. 493, 103 Pac. 792, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.)
932; McKinney v. State (1892), 3 Wyo. 719, 30 Pac. 293, 16 L. R. A. 710;
Statb v. James (1921), 96 N. J. L. 132, 114 AtI. 553, People v. Manuel (1919),
41 Cal. App. 153, 182 Pac. 306, State v. Morse, 35 S. D. 18, 150 N. W 293.
21Wright v. Stuart (1839), 5 Blackf. 120; Jones v. State (1832), 3 Blackf.
37, Mitchell v. Denbo (1833), 3 Blackf. 258.
22 (1935) 195 N. E. 268 (Ind.).
23 52 A. L. R. 920, 922, 923.
2 4 Burns' 1933, sec. 4-3304.
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be sustained because of failure to comply with a mandatory provision of
the statutes as to selection. (2) Or it might be overruled without violating
any legal principles, unless actual harm had been inflicted by the irregu-
larity. Possibly the law would seem less peremptory if actual harm was the
primary consideration. But for convenience of application and as a more
stringent guardian of the right to a trial fair in all respects, the practice
of invalidating panels drawn with a disregard of material provisions of the
statute (upon timely plea), even though it does not affirmatively appear that
any harm has ensued, is to be commended. However,. it is further submitted,
that if the case has been decided on its merits by a jury composed of indi-
vidually competent persons-persons not subject to challenge for cause, the
ruling in the principal case should not be the basis of reversible error. To
so consider this ruling on the challange to the array, is to modify the
generally accepted rules of Indiana Practice that reversible error be harmful
error.
2 5  H. A. A.
CONIrroNAL LAW-PRIMLEGES AND IMMUNrrIES CLAUSE OF THE FOaU-
TEENTH AMENDMENT.-The Vermont Income and Franchise Tax Act of 1931
imposed an individual income tax of 4 per cent. on income received on account
of ownership or use of, or interest in, any interest bearing security, denom-
inated class B income. Excluded from this tax, however, were: (a) cor-
porate dividends earned within the state; (b) interest received on account of
money loaned within the state at a rate of interest not exceeding 5 per cent.
per annum. Held, that exempting from the tax income from dividends earned
within the state did not deny equal protection of the laws, but, that exempting
from the tax income from money loaned within the state at not more than 5
per cent. interest, apart from the equality clause, violated the privileges and
immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution,
since the classification was based on a difference having no substantial rela-
tion to the revenue objective of the act.1
There would seem to be no legitimate objection on reason or authority to
the court upholding the first exemption, referred to above, as not being in
violation of the equality clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 However,
25 Morris v. State (1883), 94 Ind. 565, Hicks v. State (1927), 199 Ind. 401,
156 N. E. 548 (voir dire in court's discretion unless harm shown), Terre
Haute Electric Co. v. Watson (1904), 33 Ind. App. 124, 70 N.E. 993 (Over-
ruling of challenge for cause not reversible error unless peremptory chal-
lenges exhausted so as to constitute harm).
1 Colgate v. Harvey (1935), 56 S. Ct. 252.
2 Another Vermont tax act imposed a tax of 2 per cent. upon the net
income of every corporation for the privilege of exercising its franchise in
the state and of doing business therein. In addition to the 2 per cent. fran-
chise tax, all tangible corporate property lying within the state is subject
to a property tax. As the court points out, the 2 per cent. franchise tax,
especially with the property tax added, has the effect of indirectly imposing
a tax burden upon domestic business measurably equivalent to the 4 per cent.
tax burden imposed upon dividends realized from out-of-state business. Fur-
thermore, since the 4 per cent. tax is imposed only upon such part of the
corporate net income as passes to the shareholders in the form of dividends,
and the 2 per cent. tax is measured by the entire net income of the corpora-
tion, it may well be that the one tax burden would approximate the other.
It seems clear, therefore, that the classification relative to dividends is not
arbitrary. It has always been the doctrine of the Supreme Court that, though
